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No-Man is an Island: UK and EU Banking Regulatory 
Engagement after “Brexit”
ALAN BRENER*
Abstract
Banking and its issues do not respect jurisdictional boundaries. Whatever form 
“brexit” eventually takes the most significant aspects of banking regulation are, and 
will remain, international. This paper considers the UK’s continuing need for cross-
border engagement with the EU in the key operational areas of standard setting, 
supervision, crisis management, anti-money laundering and payments systems. In 
addition, it looks at how close coordination with the EU can help address the risk of 
“regulatory capture” and, separately, in improving culture, ethics and governance in 
banking. 
Consequently, it is important that the UK and the other European states, together 
with other jurisdictions, continue to work to maintain and develop cross-border coop-
eration. Moreover, the UK, and the other states, will continue to need to conform to 
the highest global standards. This will extend to cross-border supervision and coor-
dination set against a background of common standard setting. 
At some point it is inevitable that there will be another serious banking crisis. The 
effects are likely to extend across borders. Consequently, even outside the EU, the 
eurozone and the scope of the European Central Bank, the UK will need to prepare 
and to engage closely with the EU’s developing financial crisis management arrange-
ments. This will include cross-border recovery and resolution planning. 
In addition, many UK based banks participate in global financial markets. These 
are vast with, for example, turnover in foreign exchange runs at some $5 trillion a 
day and these international markets have a considerable influence on the UK’s domes-
tic economy. Many of these trades are cleared with central counterparties (CCPs) 
which may be located in mainland EU states (e.g. Eurex Clearing and Nasdaq OMX). 
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All CCPs present operational and credit risks and the UK will need to continue, post-
brexit, to have a close interest in these organisations and to continue to satisfy EU 
CCP standards.
Further, cross-border liaison will still be necessary to prevent money laundering 
and sanctions breaking. Cross-border prevention of market abuse and money launder-
ing will continue to be important and the UK, post-brexit, will need to work with a 
variety of EU bodies such as the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing, the EU Financial Intelligence Units Platform and the Joint Committee of 
European Supervisory Authorities. 
Similarly, the UK will still need to be involved in the EU’s payment systems to 
ensure continuing access for trade and investment. This will be necessary so that the 
UK can continue to influence access and transaction costs and the technical and 
regulatory standard required as the payment systems evolve.
More broadly, whenever financial institutions form a significant part of an econ-
omy there is a risk of actual, or perceived, “regulatory capture”. This is a particular 
risk in the UK where, for example, the banking industry employs some five hundred 
thousand people and pays a significant proportion of total taxes. Consequently, there 
is an increased need to work closely, whether formally or informally, with other EU 
regulators to ensure that the standards that are set are those designed to benefit markets 
and consumers and not simply the result of industry lobbying.
Finally, the financial crisis and subsequent scandals have revealed serious deficien-
cies in the culture, ethics and governance of banks. Many senior individuals were able 
to escape any responsibility due to a lack of individual accountability. Again, many 
of these institutions operated internationally and it is important that the EU and UK 
continue to work, post-brexit, to ensure that senior individuals in banks are held to 
account and that financial institutions work to the highest standards of cultural and 
ethical behaviour.
All of this confirms the need for continuing close UK and EU cooperation in finan-
cial services if only to avoid significant problems in the future whatever that might 
look like.
1. Introduction
“No man is an island entire of itself; every man
is a piece of the continent, a part of the main;
if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe
is the less, as well as if a promontory were”1
Following the brexit referendum the UK may seek to remove itself from the EU but 
in the context of financial services, and specifically, banking this may not be fully 
1 John Donne, Meditation XVII, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions, 195 (original published 1624, 
reprinted as “Donne’s Devotions”, D.A Talboys, Oxford, 1841).
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possible. This paper does not seek to cover all the linkages but instead concentrates 
on a number of significant aspects where, post-brexit, the UK will continue to need 
to work closely with EU institutions. Failure to do so may increases significantly the 
risk of both financial crises and financial crime.
Much of the rule-making in these areas take the form of supra-national “soft” law. 
As a major participant in global financial markets the UK needs to enact regulations 
to implement these expectations. Moreover, the UK has an important role in the for-
mation of these “soft” laws. Currently, many of these have been promulgated in the 
form of EU Directives and Regulations. Again, as a member of the EU the UK has 
been very influential in this process. However, post-brexit this is unlikely to continue. 
Nevertheless, the UK will still be expected to implement and enforce these global 
“soft” laws. This will need to be in lock-step with developments in the EU if financial 
services in the UK are to have access to EU markets and for there still to be a level 
of mutual recognition.
In a financial “multipolar world” with “cross-border financial transactions and 
regulations [it is] imperative to cooperate.”2 This is exacerbated by significant mac-
roeconomic imbalances and national regulatory tools are likely to be ineffective unless 
undertaken in concert with other countries and international authorities. In addition, 
a failure to cooperate and to introduce and maintain recognised equivalent regulatory 
systems may result in financial markets being closed to UK based firms. Moreover, 
the UK’s financial stability defences are only as good as those developed and enhanced 
by its neighbours. There are analogies in the area of defences against human, animal, 
arboreal and crop diseases and the need for close international cooperation.
It is possible to view regulation as the outcome of competing financial interests 
and in this context there may be siren voices arguing against continuing cooperation 
with EU institutions. Moreover, in order to reinforce their case, they may seek to 
claim, for example, that EU proposals are contrary to the national interest. They may 
also state that local regulations needs to be protected since there are differences 
between national conceptual approaches to regulation.3 In some instances this may 
be correct while in others it may just be “special pleading”. There will be other cir-
cumstances where regulation is seen as a form of national competitive advantage. 
This could be because regulation, and its enforcement, is lax. Alternatively, strict 
enforcement action may improve the attractiveness of markets.4
States compete to attract firms to invest within their borders and to retain those 
that have already done so. However, it is unclear to what extent regulation and par-
ticularly financial services regulation is a significant factor in these corporate deci-
2 Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century, 
60 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 2015). These national regulatory concepts are 
described by Brummer as “regulatory philosophy”.
3 Ibid., at 263–264.
4 For example, a higher propensity for US regulators to undertake enforcement action deters certain 
firms from seeking a US listing and thus acts as signaling device to investors and consequently reduces 
costs by increasing investor trust, John Coffee, Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement 156 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 229, 245–246 (2007).
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sions.5 The need to minimise Coasian transaction costs, which include regulation, will 
be important.6 Nevertheless, the evidence, based on bank cross-border acquisitions, 
appears to support the view that the strength and “quality of bank regulation plays an 
economically important role ...” with strong regulation providing a sound base for 
cross-border growth and expansion.7 However, while there are real risks that “suggest 
that domestic bank regulation and supervision have important [cross-border] spillover 
effects,” business regulatory arbitrage is subject to a number of constraints which 
include, for example, political and perception limits.8
Consequently, it is important to recognise that regulation is susceptible to influence 
by national power groupings and economic interests, usually manifest in the realm 
of corporate governance.9 For example, this can be seen in the relative powers and 
responsibilities of shareholders, boards and other stakeholders or, in a related area, 
how reward and risk is allocated. The risk of “regulatory capture” is considered in 
more detail later.10
Economic structures will also influence the structure of regulation and how banks 
and financial markets finance the “real” economy and the state and the role of the 
latter in these processes.11 This goes to the heart of the purpose of banking and its 
activities in national and global economies. However, while these issues are beyond 
the scope of this paper they demonstrate the importance of international cooperation 
particularly, for the UK, at the supra-national EU level. This is all the more relevant 
since all the important EU banks have operations in the UK and, by number, they 
constitute a significant part of the UK banking system.12
5 There are numerous studies with conflicting results. For example, Houston et al supports the view 
that banks will move investments to jurisdictions with weaker regulation, Joel Houston, Chen Lin and 
Yue Ma, Regulatory Arbitrage and International Bank Flows, 57 Journal of Finance 1845, 1847 (2012). 
6 Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 Texas. Law Review 227, 231–232 (2010–2011).
7 Andrew Karolyi and Alvaro Taboada, Regulatory Arbitrage and Cross-Border Bank Acquisitions, 
70 Journal of Finance 2395, 2438 (2015).
8 Steven Ongena, Alexander Popov and Gregory Udell, When the Cat’s Away the Mice will Play’: 
Does Regulation at Home Affect Bank Risk-Taking Abroad?, 108, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 
727, 748 and 252 (June 2013).
9 Marc Moore, Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the State, 13 (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2013), which considers “causes and consequences of the allocation of power within large economic 
organisations”.
10 For a wider discussion of regulatory theory see Michael Moran, Theories of Regulation and 
Changes in Regulation: The Case of Financial Markets 34 Political Studies 185 (1986) and Sukhdev 
Johal, Michael Moran and Karel Williams, Power, Politics and the City of London after the Great 
Financial Crisis 49 Government and Opposition 400, (2014). For a view of the development of regula-
tion from a less deterministic point of view see Julia Black, Enrolling Actors in the Regulatory Systems: 
Examples from UK Financial Services Regulation, Public Law 63 (2003).
11 The role of the state is often not immediately obvious and range from local usury laws to wide-
spread market interventions in for example, the residential mortgage markets. For a broader consideration 
of this subject see Oonagh McDonald, Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac, 1–24 and 115–141,(Bloomsbury, 
London, 2012),
12 By number there are some 245 non-UK banks operating in the UK. Of these around ninety are 
other EU or Swiss banks (37%), twenty-three are US (9%), nine are Japanese (4%), twenty-three are 
Canadian and Australian (9%), thirteen are from other developed countries (5%) and just under ninety 
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This paper highlights the need for cooperation in five operational areas. These 
include the important and growing role of central counterparties, financial conglom-
erate cross-border supervision, international payments systems, the prevention and 
detection of financial crime and financial crisis management. The UK has a substan-
tial financial services industry and is dependent on international trade and investment. 
Consequently, it cannot operate at a distance from other regulators and other similar 
agencies in the rest of Europe and elsewhere. The UK will continue to have a voice 
at the global level via organisations such a the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and 
the International Organisation of Security Commissions (IOSCO). EU institutions 
and Member States have in the past adopted these global standards and this will con-
tinue post-brexit. This will include the UK and, ideally, it should try to maintain a 
dialogue with the various EU institutions where there are a range of possible inter-
pretations of international guidance. However, following brexit, this right to be con-
sulted and involved in the decision making is likely to be lost. Nevertheless, 
depending on the results of the negotiations for UK’s exit from the EU, there may be 
continuing obligation to implement and to enforce EU Directives and Regulations in 
this, and other, areas. This would, of course, preclude the UK influencing these 
requirements. In any event, as mentioned earlier, the UK would probably wish to 
maintain a level of regulatory equivalence with the rest of the EU to ensure the con-
tinuing recognition by the EU of both “passporting” rights and the operation of cen-
tral counterparties.
In addition, this paper considers two other significant areas which are often over-
looked by both national and supra-national regulators. First is inherent in the risk of 
local jurisdictional “capture” of the regulators and supervisors by regulated firms. 
However, regulatory “capture” is more difficult the more remote the regulatory and 
supervisory organisations. This is particularly true for bodies such as the EU Com-
mission and Parliament which are not only physically distant but may also be subject 
to an increased range of countervailing views which may negate domestic industry 
pressures.
Second, is the need to coordinate the improvement of culture, ethics and individual 
accountability within financial institutions. It is a matter of global importance that 
financial firms, and others, operate in accordance with the highest ethical standards 
and that individuals in charge of areas within these businesses are held accountable 
for their actions.
The over-arching purpose of close cooperation with the regulatory agencies of 
other jurisdictions is to demonstrate the UK’s “trustworthiness”. While it is under-
stood that the UK will act in the interest of promoting its own financial services 
industry nevertheless, it will not do anything which undermines the greater interna-
tional good. As John Donne recognised, this is not due to any degree of higher altru-
are from the rest of the World (36%), Prudential Regulatory Authority, Institutions included in the 
United Kingdom banking sector <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/reporters/institutions/
default.aspx> (accessed 12th August 2016).
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ism but rather the understanding that we are all inextricably connected and that harm 
to one may result in harm to all.
For all these reasons, post-brexit, the UK will need to ensure close and continuous 
liaison with the EU and its agencies. Moreover, these contacts will need to be devel-
oped and deepened since any other option presents considerable dangers and difficul-
ties both to the UK and more globally.
2. Central Counter Parties (CCPs)
Following the financial crisis there has been a global move to encourage the develop-
ment of central counterparties (CCPs) and to restrict the development of bespoke 
over-the-counter (OTC) financial products. A number of CCPs are currently based 
within EU mainland states (e.g. Eurex Clearing and Nasdaq OMX) and it is likely, 
post-brexit, that some CCPs involved in clearing Euro contracts will move from Lon-
don to the EU.13
The collapse of Lehman’s and the near failure of AIG and the subsequent interna-
tional market instability indicated that the large number of OTC contracts “had created 
a complex and deeply interdependent network of exposures that ultimately contrib-
uted to a build-up of systemic risk. The stresses of the crisis exposed these risks: 
insufficient transparency regarding counterparty exposures; inadequate collateralisa-
tion practices; cumbersome operational processes” etc.14 Consequently, the G20 
group of countries issued a declaration, following their meeting in 2009 in Pittsburg, 
that “all standardised OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or 
electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central counter-
parties by end-2012 at the latest.”15
CCPs have many advantages but at the same time they present a number of sig-
nificant risks since they stand behind each and every transaction. They provide a 
degree of certainty to counterparties but at the same time CCPs are repositories of 
both concentrated market and credit risks. CCPs are “highly interconnected with 
market participants and financial markets. Its activities or default may cause negative 
externalities in extreme circumstances.”16
13 European Securities and Markets Authority, List of Central Counterparties authorised to offer 
services and activities in the Union, (May 2016), <https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/
ccps_authorised_under_emir.pdf>, (accessed 15th August 2016).
14 Financial Stability Board, OTC Derivatives Reforms Progress: Report from the FSB Chairman 
for the G20 Leaders’ Summit, (September 2013), <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130902a.
pdf?page_moved=1> the most recent failure of a CCP was the Hong Kong Futures Exchange which 
failed following the 1987 crash.
15 G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, (Pittsburgh, 24–25th September 2009,), <https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Pages/g20.aspx>.
16 Froukelien Wendt, Central Counterparties: Addressing Their Too Important to Fail Nature, IMF 
Working Paper 15/21, 3, (2015), <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1521.pdf>.
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Moreover, CCPs are connected by an additional complex web of engagements with 
their members and the banking systems. The latter may provide clearing and liquidity 
arrangements for CCP members and for the CCP itself and additional depository and 
custodian services. CCP members also assist non-members by allowing access to 
CCPs. Finally, in a crisis banks may assist “during a default of a clearing member by 
helping the CCP to liquidate and hedge the defaulter’s positions and by taking over 
the positions of the defaulter’s clients. This may include providing prices for illiquid 
contracts.”17
The dangers inherent in highly concentrated CCPs have been recognised including 
their ability to “disrupt related markets”.18 In addition, “potential complications are 
introduced if CCPs clear transactions originated outside the local market, involve 
counterparties from different jurisdictions, or deal with collateral located or issued in 
different countries or denominated in different currencies. Such internationally active 
CCPs require greater regulatory coordination than purely domestic ones.”19
This was reinforced in 2012 when the Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems and IOSCO issued the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures 
(PFMIs).20 “The latter sets out new international standards for payment, clearing and 
settlement systems, including central counterparties. [The] new standards are designed 
to ensure that the infrastructure supporting global financial markets is more robust 
and thus well placed to withstand financial shocks.”21
Consequently, CCPs are seen as systemically significant and supervised by national 
authorities within the EU and subject to European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA) rules across the EU. In order to meet individual risks CCPs are subject to a 
“waterfall” series of loss absorbing schemes if members are unable to honour their 
contracts. These start with the CCP using its own contingency fund to meet defaults 
and if this is not sufficient some of the CCP’s own capital will be used before raising 
a levy on all surviving members and finally using its remaining capital. The success 
of this process will depend on both the quality of the CCP’s management and opera-
tions and the regulation and supervision of the business.
17 Ibid., at 9.
18 IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report, Ch. 3, Making Over-the-counter Derivatives Safer: 
The Role of Central Counterparties in Meeting New Challenges to Stability and Building a Safer 
System, World Economic and Financial Surveys, 110, (2010), <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
gfsr/2010/01/pdf/text.pdf>.
19 Ibid., at 110.
20 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and International Organization of Secu-
rities Commissions, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (April 2012), <http://www.bis.
org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf>. This replace the three existing sets of international standards set out in the 
Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems (2001), Recommendations for Securities 
Settlement Systems (2001) and Recommendations for Central Counterparties (2004). The CPSS was 
given a new mandate and renamed the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) in 
September 2014. It is worth noting that the CPMI has no legal authority or structure. It relies on its 
membership to carry out its mandate, (CPMI’s charter, 2014), <https://www.bis.org/cpmi/charter.pdf>.
21 BIS, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (April 2012), <http://www.bis.org/cpmi/
publ/d101.htm> (accessed 15th August 2016).
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In addition, in times of financial stress, CCPs may spread risk across markets as 
they seek to close out positions subject to counterparty default. This may affect other 
CCPs and have a destabilising cross-market and cross-border effect. These risks have 
been recognised and EU states hosting CCPs are required to designate a “national 
competent authority” (NCA) to authorise and supervise them.22 There are a range of 
potential cross-jurisdictional issues that could arise. For example, the NCA respon-
sible for a CCP may designate that the bonds issued by a counterparty are an unac-
ceptable security for covering margin calls. Consequently, the NCA, in its desire to 
protect the solvency of the CCP, may threaten the solvency of, for example, a bank 
in another jurisdiction. The effect could be pro-cyclical with consequential financial 
contagion spreading from country to country.
Consequently, the ESMA, requires NCAs to set up CCP supervisory colleges con-
sisting of the NCAs with the closest connections with the CCP (e.g. responsible for 
the supervision of the clearing members of the CCP that are established in the three 
Member States with the largest contributions to the default fund of the CCP, super-
vising central securities depositories to which the CCP is linked etc).23 The colleges 
will coordinate work on areas such as stress testing, CCP capital and margining mod-
els etc.24 In addition, the ESMA is a member of each college and carries out reviews 
of each NCA, including, in particular, the operation of the cross-jurisdictional col-
leges.25 The colleges are required to have written agreements between its members 
setting out the organisation and operation of the colleges.26 It is important that CCPs 
have adequate recovery and resolution plans and CCP colleges will have an important 
role in their development and operation.27
There are eighteen CCPs within the current EU; each with its own college. The 
purpose of the latter are to better assess risk and to coordinate actions and spread best 
practice and to facilitate communication.28 It is recognised that “coordination of the 
respective regulatory authorities is ...essential. [However], this coordination can be 
22 Art. 22, Chapter, 2, “OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories”, Regu-
lation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 4th July 2012,< http://www.
eachccp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CELEX-32012R0648-EN-TXT.pdf>. These regulations are also 
known as European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR).
23 Ibid., Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, Art. 18.
24 Ibid., Arts 15, 17, 49, 51 and 54.
25 ESMA, Annual Report 2015, 14–16, (June 2016), <https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/
library/2016-960_esma_annual_report_2015.pdf>.
26 ESMA, Guidelines and Recommendations Regarding Written Agreements Between Members of 
CCP Colleges, 12–26, (June 2013), <http://www.eachccp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Guidelines-
on-written-agreements-between-members-of-CCP-colleges.pdf>.
27 Paul Tucker, Central Counterparties in Evolving Capital Markets: Safety, Recovery and Resolu-
tion, 17 Banque de France Financial Stability Review, 183–184 (April 2013), <https://www.banque-
france.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/publications/Revue_de_la_stabilite_financiere/2013/
rsf-avril-2013/18-TUCKER_Paul.pdf>.
28 See the website of one of the major NCAs: Germany’s Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleis-
tungsaufsicht (BaFin), <http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Fachartikel/2016/
fa_bj_1603_zentrale_gegenparteien_en.html?nn=7858612#doc7874230bodyText3> (accessed 18th July 
2016).
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extremely difficult to achieve, not least because of substantive differences across legal 
and regulatory regimes.”29
CCP failures have been rare with the most recent examples being the Hong Kong 
Futures Guarantee Corporation (1987), the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing 
House (1983) and the Caisse de Liquidation (Paris) (1974).30 The last of these is the 
most interesting since the allocation of liabilities and the resolution of the CCP were 
complicated by a series of court actions. It is entirely possible that similar issues may 
arise again where the operations of an exchange and its orderly resolution cannot 
proceed until the respective liabilities of the parties have been determined by the 
courts. This builds delay and uncertainty into the process and places more responsi-
bility on the CCP colleges of supervisors. Consequently, these bodies have an impor-
tant role.
The Bank of England is the current NCA for five CCPs and its approach to super-
vision forms part of the EU regulation and supervisory regime.31 The Bank also works 
with other non-EU jurisdictions. However, the latter operate outside the comprehen-
sive EU European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) structure discussed 
earlier in this section.32 Since both EU and non-EU cooperation are important the 
Bank of England is keen to assess “the effectiveness of the arrangements ... including 
whether information sharing is sufficient and timely, whether collective decision 
making mechanisms are effective, and whether co-operation is genuine.”33
Post-Brexit the UK would be designated as a “third country, (Non-EU)” and need 
to apply to ESMA for its CCPs to be recognised as operating with regulatory equiv-
alence to the requirements of EMIR.34 Some forty-five third country (non-EU) CCPs 
have applied for recognition by ESMA under Article 25 of EMIR and an additional 
nineteen have been recognised.35 Without ESMA recognition UK based CCPs could 
29 Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice (International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association Discussion Paper No. 1, 42, May 2011).
30 Bob Hills, David Rule, Sarah Parkinson and Chris Young, Central Counterparty Clearing Houses 
and Financial Stability, Bank of England Financial Stability Review, 122, 129–130 (June 1999), <http://
www.eachccp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/CCP.pdf>.
31 Amandeep Rehlon and Dan Nixon, Central Counterparties: What Are They, Why Do They Matter 
and How Does the Bank Supervise Them?, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Q2, 7, (2013) <http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2013/qb1302ccpsbs.pdf>.
32 Supra, n 22, EMIR.
33 Bank of England, The Bank of England’s Approach to the Supervision of Financial Market 
Infrastructures, 8–9 (December 2012), <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/
news/2012/nr161.pdf>. See also The Bank of England, Supervision of Financial Market Infrastruc-
tures – Annual Report, 16–18 (March 2015), <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/
fmi/annualreport2015.pdf>.
34 Chapter 4 of Title III of Regulation (EU) No 648/20121 (EMIR) and Ch. II of Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013 of 19th December 2012 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 
648/2012 with regard to regulatory technical standards on requirements for central counterparties (RTS). 
See ESMA, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, ESMA web-site, <https://www.esma.europa.
eu/regulation/post-trading/central-counterparties-ccps> (accessed 5th September 2016).
35 ESMA, List of central counterparties (CCPs) established in non-EEA countries which have 
applied for recognition under Art. 25 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament 
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not provide services to EU based counterparties. While it is likely that at the time of 
making their applications for recognition the UK based CCPs would be able to dem-
onstrate this level of equivalence the recognition and approval process may be lengthy. 
Unless a transitional period of “deemed recognition” was agreed as part of the brexit 
process the interim period might be very adverse for the business prospects of the UK 
based CCPs.
Consequently, market forces are likely to ensure that the UK continues to comply 
with EU requirements in the area of CCPs. Moreover, EU legislation provides the 
measure of best practice for CCPs with international counterparties. Both these fac-
tors will be important in ensuring the UK’s compliance with EU CCP legislation.
3. Financial Supervision
During the recent financial crisis there were many examples where cross-border 
supervision of financial institutions failed. This risk continues and in particular, there 
is the potential for “national supervisors [to] fulfill a sub-optimal supervisory policy” 
in failing to take account of “cross-border externalities resulting from integrated 
European banking markets”.36
The issue of cross-border supervisory failures is recognised both internationally 
and at a European level. This has lead to international “soft” law changes and a new 
EU financial services regulatory architecture.
At a global level the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision restated its core 
principles for effective bank supervision in 2012.37 Principle 12, on consolidated 
supervision, sets out the basic requirement that banking groups need to be supervised 
on a consolidated basis with the group looked at as a whole with information provided 
to the consolidated supervisor on all the significant aspects of the business no matter 
where located. This is a particular issue when a banking group operates across one 
or more borders.
Principle 13 emphasises the need for close cross-border cooperation between 
supervisors. It involves operating supervisory colleges, regular and timely informa-
tion sharing, supervisory coordination and close consultation between supervisors. It 
is seen, correctly, as important that cross-border supervisors share similar high stan-
dards and a shared view and understanding of the risks run by banking groups they 
and of the Council (EMIR), <https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/list_of_applicants_tc-
ccps.pdf>, and List of third-country central counterparties recognised to offer services and activities in 
the Union <https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/third-country_ccps_recognised_under_
emir.pdf> (accessed 5th September 2016).
36 Martin Schüler, Incentive Problems in Banking Supervision – The European Case, Centre for 
European Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 03–62, 5 (2003), <ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/
dp/dp0362.pdf>.
37 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, 
11 and 35–39 (September 2012), <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf>.
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supervise.38 The supervisors also need to work in tandem on the development and 
operation of recovery and resolution plans.39 This latter aspect is considered in more 
detail later in this paper.
Currently, the Prudential Regulatory Authority, as part of the Bank of England, is 
the UK banks’ prudential supervisor. It is represented on the various supervisory col-
leges for cross-border European banks along with the European Central Bank and 
other national supervisors.40 Post-brexit it is uncertain how, if at all, these arrange-
ments would continue. Clearly, it is important that they do. The consequences, if they 
do not, will be greater risk to individual institutions and to financial stability. It could 
also result in significant economic inefficiency as supervisors places greater require-
ments on domestic entities in an attempt to make up for increased uncertainty due to 
reduced levels of cooperations.
Everything depends on there being a large element of trust between supervisors. 
This is especially pertinent in a system of “meta-regulation” where rules are made 
requiring, for example, banks to establish sounds systems of risk management but it 
is left to the individual firms to determine how best to achieve this.41 However, trust 
between cross-border supervisors may be fragile for a range of reasons including 
national politics, regulatory cultures, differences in legal systems and different per-
spectives due to economic and regulatory competition. It is possible that banking 
groups may influence these views.42 These issues may be exacerbated by states’ less 
or more generous deposit protection schemes.43 In addition, the evidence suggests 
that “national supervisors have biased incentives when dealing with cross-border 
banks” depending on what and who is at risk.44 Consequently, the building of trust 
between supervisors is crucial.
Moreover, there has been a tendency to avoid discussing the “nuts and bolts” of 
supervision and to concentrate on the more high profile areas of regulation, for exam-
38 Ibid., at 38.
39 Ibid., at 38.
40 Bank of England, The Prudential Regulation Authority’s Approach to Banking  Supervision, 
28 (March 2016), <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/praapproach/bank
ingappr1603.pdf>.
41 Mads Andenas and Iris H-Y Chiu, The Foundations and Future of Financial Regulation, 358 
(Routledge, Abingdon, 2014).
42 See Harald Sandera, Stefanie Kleimeierc and Sylvia Heuchemera, The Resurgence of Cultural 
Borders During the Financial Crisis: The Changing Geography of Eurozone Cross-Border Deposit-
ing, Journal of Financial Stability 12–26 (June 2016). This papers considers the break-down in trust in 
European financial services after the financial crisis started. 
43 Robert Eisenbeis, George Kaufman, Cross Border Banking: Challenges for Deposit Insurance 
and Financial Stability in the European Union in Harald Benink, Charles Goodhart and Rosa Lastra 
(eds), Prompt Corrective Action & Cross-Border Supervisory Issues in Europe, 171, 5, 12–15 (Financial 
Markets Group) at <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Clas_Wihlborg/publication/5055472_Prompt_
Corrective_Action__Cross-Border_Supervisory_Issues_in_Europe/links/00b49524a66b96a410000000.
pdf#page=97>.
44 Thorsten Beck, Radomir Todorov and Wolf Wagner, Supervising Cross-Border Banks: Theory, 
Evidence and Policy 28 Economic Policy Issue 73, 5, 36 (January 2013).
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ple, covering capital and liquidity.45 This is of concern since, as briefly mentioned 
earlier, much of the important supervisory information falls outside the “hard num-
bers” and will, for example, include informal assessments of operating systems and 
the quality of senior bank staff.46 This information is not normally formally noted and 
its breadth and depth depends on the knowledge and experience of individual super-
visors. The success of supervisory colleges will depend on the extent to which, if at 
all, this anecdotal information is disseminated between supervisors and the subsequent 
use made of this intelligence. Consequently, supervisory colleges need to foster a 
spirit of trust and a collegiate atmosphere. This requires trained, experience staff, and 
a first rate chairman and secretariat. It is reinforced by frequent, face-to-face meetings 
and barrier-breaching dinners together.
The structure of the European Single Supervisory Mechanism with the close 
involvement of the non-Euro states, such as the UK, did provide progress in this area.47 
In addition, bilateral agreements in the form of memoranda of understandings can 
take cross-border supervision part of the way forward but, post-brexit, the supervisory 
task is likely to be more difficult unless stronger links are developed. If it fails the 
supervision of cross-border banks across Europe, including the UK, will be signifi-
cantly more difficult and subject to much high risks.
4. Crisis Management Arrangements Including Recovery and Resolution 
Planning
Bank failures occur very fast and the steps to resolve them need to be undertaken in 
a matter of hours. This often takes place against a background of unrelenting political, 
socio-economic and financial stability concerns. The process may be further compli-
cated as the crisis management bodies seek to protect their own reputations and those 
of their senior executives and boards. In parallel politicians and supervisors may try 
to minimise the extent of their own responsibilities.
Some financial institutions fail due to bad luck but in most instances the problems 
are due to poor management. This was evident in the recent financial crisis where, 
often, problems arose due to significant wrong business decisions and strategies. This 
was highlighted by the liquidity deficits which rapidly become solvency issues.48 
45 Niamh Moloney, Supervision in the Wake of the Financial Crisis in Eddy Wymeersch, Klaus 
Hopt, and Guido Ferrarini (eds), Financial Regulation and Supervision: A Post-Crisis Analysis, 
para. 4.04 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012).
46 Thorsten Beck, Regulatory Cooperation on Cross-Border Banking: Progress and Challenges 
after the Crisis 235 National Institute Economic Review 44, 42 (February 2016).
47 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15th October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:287:0063:0089:EN:PDF>.
48 Laurent Clerc and others, Indirect Contagion: The Policy Problem, European Systemic Risk 
Board, Occasional Paper No. 9, 1, 6–11, (January 2016), <https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/occa-
sional/20160126_occasional_paper_9.pdf?901f79d9aad9596f9ab3e4774427c985>.
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Consequently, the reduction in the value of the assets of an insolvent bank will result 
in anyone who has a claim on these assets suffering losses. This is difficult enough 
when the bank only operates within one jurisdiction. However, this issue is magnified 
if the failed bank has cross-border operations since it is unlikely that assets and lia-
bilities are perfectly matched in each jurisdiction.49 For example, this was highlighted 
in the collapse of Fortis Bank in the summer of 2008 and the lack of cooperation 
between the Netherlands and Belgium authorities.50 Although the Belgian Banking, 
Finance and Insurance Commission (CBFA) was in the lead coordinating supervision 
of the banking group there was an apparent failure to recognise the size of Fortis’ 
Dutch business following the acquisition of ABN-AMRO more than a year earlier. 
The subsequent unilateral nationalisation of the Dutch portions of the Fortis group 
was complicated by continuing legal proceedings in the Belgium courts.51
As mentioned earlier, the key issue is that at any point in time the assets and lia-
bilities of a cross-border financial group are unlikely to be matched within each juris-
diction. As a result, of domestic political, media and social pressures each state will 
do its best, quickly, to secure any assets. Information sharing with other regulators is 
likely to break-down and national legal obligations will come into operation.52 Some 
jurisdictions will act earlier than others depending on their recovery and resolution 
regimes and their perceptions of the risks posed by the business both globally and 
within their own control. These actions are normally undertaken very swiftly, within 
a matter of hours, without much, or any, prior notice. This is a particular issue for the 
UK with many overseas banks operating in this country and, in parallel, UK banks 
with businesses across the world.53
In summary, national supervisors and resolution authorities are likely to be in 
competition with each other. They will have different levels of information about the 
entity in trouble and possess a range of competencies and resources. In addition, they 
will be subject to political, public and media pressures and will probably be working 
with varied legal and accounting systems.54 While, superficially, it may be expedient 
to operate an exclusively nationalistic crisis management regime the adverse conse-
quences may be severe. The result would be a very fragmented financial system. Each 
business would need to be set up as a self-contained entity in each jurisdiction with 
its own capital, liquidity, local management and operating systems. This system of 
49 Thomas Huertas, Crisis, Cause, Containment and Cure, 121–122, (Palgrave Macmillan, Basing-
stoke, 2010).
50 Yves Fassin and Derrick Gosselin, The Collapse of a European Bank in the Financial Crisis: 
An Analysis from Stakeholder and Ethical Perspectives 102 Journal of Business Ethics 169, 178–180 
(2011).
51 Richard Herring, The Challenge of Resolving Cross-Border Financial Institutions 31 Yale Jour-
nal of Regulations 853, 872–873 (2014).
52 Ibid., at 858.
53 See the Bank of England’s list of banks operating in the UK as at 1st July 2016, <http://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/reporters/institutions/default.aspx> (accessed 9th August 2016).
54 Stijn Claessens, Richard Herring and Dirk Schoenmaker, A Safer World Financial System: 
Improving the Resolution of Systemic Institutions, Geneva Reports on the World Economy 12, 29–31 
(2010), <http://cepr.org/sites/default/files/geneva_reports/GenevaP210.pdf>.
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financial autarchy would require each financial services company to maintain control 
systems which would have to check, “in real-time”, that assets, liabilities and poten-
tial obligations were matched within each country. They would probably need to 
maintain a “buffer” of unencumbered assets in each jurisdiction to ensure that, at any 
given moment, sufficient assets were available to meet domestic liabilities. In many 
ways it would mirror the exchange control arrangements that existed prior to the late 
1970s in the UK. It would be safe but inefficient and it would not be conducive to 
enhancing trust between nations.
Consequently, crisis management cooperation is fundamental to financial institu-
tion regulation and supervision. Consequently, the Financial Stability Board has 
issued a number of papers providing guidance on the subject of bank recovery and 
resolution and has consulted on various important elements.55 These documents cover 
cooperation and information sharing, temporary financial support and continuing 
operational assistance following a bank resolution. However, the most important 
guidance is contained in a set of principles.56 These include the alignment of cross-
border resolution powers and legal recognition of resolution actions in foreign juris-
dictions.57 The Principles also require national resolution authorities to encourage 
financial institutions to adopt contractual measures such as temporary limitations on 
counterparty rights and developing a “bail-in” regime covering the “write-down, 
cancellation or conversion of debt instruments”.58 However, although these Principles 
provide useful guidance, a large cross-border banking failure is likely to be a political 
event and everything will depend on levels of trust. If there is a lack of trust every 
action by a national regulatory agency is likely to be seen as an attempt to steal a 
march on the other jurisdictions involved.
The EU’s Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) has taken forward 
work in this area to reduce these real risks within the EU.59 The UK was highly influ-
ential in developing this Directive and following a PRA consultation and implemen-
tation process it came into force in the UK early in 2015.60 However, post-bexit the 
results of this sound work may be forfeited by the UK. Consequently, no-one knows 
what the future structure of financial services in the UK will look like nor what will 
be the future relationship with the EU, in this area, going forward. However, it is 
unlikely that the UK’s current level of influence on the formation of EU banking and 
55 Financial Stability Board, New Measures to Promote Resolvability, Including Effective Cross-
Border Resolution (November 2015), <http://www.fsb.org/2015/11/new-measures-to-promote-resolv
ability-including-effective-cross-border-resolution/>.
56 Financial Stability Board, Principles for Cross-border Effectiveness of Resolution Actions, 11–16 
(2015), <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Principles-for-Cross-border-Effectiveness-of-Resolu
tion-Actions.pdf>.
57 Ibid., at 11–13.
58 Ibid., at 15.
59 Directive 2014/59/ EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive: establishing a framework for 
the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=en>.
60 PRA Consultation Paper | CP13/14, Implementing the Bank Recovery and Resolution Direc-
tive (July 2014), <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/cp/2014/cp1314.pdf>.
BANKING REGULATORY ENGAGEMENT AFTER “BREXIT” [2016] EBLR 1043
financial services regulation will continue. It is possible that in order to maintain 
access to EU financial markets some form of “regulatory equivalence” will be neces-
sary and this will entail the UK adopting some or all of the EU’s laws in this area 
going forward.61 Nevertheless, whatever rules are adopted the key elements will be 
continuing regular and frequent engagement with EU institutions, supervisors and 
national resolution authorities. Everything will depend on establishing and maintain-
ing trust with these organisations if the UK is to operate a successful and coordinated 
cross-border recovery and resolution process.
5. Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Enforcement
The importance of the fight against corruption and terrorism continues to increase 
and both the UK and EU have important roles in this area.62 Just as with financial 
crises money laundering and sanctions infringement know no borders. National 
authorities responsible for combating financial crime need to cooperate with each 
other to be effective. In part this requires all these bodies to work to common rules 
and standards, to share information and to carry-out joint actions across borders. This 
mirrors the criminal organisations which specialise in money laundering and evading 
sanctions.63 As discussed below, while bilateral cross-border agreements are helpful 
these are immeasurably stronger when groups of regulators and enforcement agencies, 
working within an international framework, know each other and building on this 
trust work together as a team.
Global and EU level Common Rules and Standards
As a supra-national organisation the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) produces 
“soft” law “to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory 
and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and 
other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system.”64 The UK 
is a member of FATF. In addition, the EU Commission is a member in its own right 
representing “the interests of Europe as a whole.”65 The EU has a key role in translat-
61 EU Commission, Banking and Finance, Equivalence with EU Rules and Supervision: Recognition 
of Foreign Frameworks, http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/global/equivalence/index_en.htm, 
(accessed 9th August 2016).
62 Mart Laar, The Cancer of the Modern World – A European Perspective in Against Corrup-
tion: A Collection of Essays, The Prime Minister’s Office web-site, ( May 2016) <https://www.gov.
uk/government/publications/against-corruption-a-collection-of-essays/against-corruption-a-collection-
of-essays#mart-laar-the-cancer-of-the-modern-world--a-european-perspective> (accessed 23rd August 
2016).
63 Friedrich Schneider and Ursula Windischbauer, Money Laundering: Some Facts 26 European 
Journal of Law and Economics 387, 389–390 (2008).
64 Financial Action Task Force, “Who we are” and “What we do” at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
about/>, (accessed 21st July 2016).
65 Ibid., FATF web-site.
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ing FATF rules “into a concrete and binding legislative framework”.66 This it has 
undertaken in four anti-money laundering Directives from 1990 to 2015.67
The EU Commission also plays a part in trying to improve cooperation on anti-
money laundering between EU states and with other European agencies such as 
Europol, the EU’s law enforcement agency. Nevertheless, there is always much more 
to do in this area to improve cooperation.68 All this coincides with the UK’s clear 
interest in encouraging a greater collegiate approach.
The EU’s aim, in the context of anti-money laundering regulation has been, not 
only, to put the EU on par, if not ahead of FATF requirements but also to help all EU 
member states meet the highest standards and to ensure that there are no weak links 
to be exploited by criminals.69 For example, this can be seen in the successful joint 
efforts by FATF and the EU to persuade Austria in 1999–2000 to remove “its system 
of anonymous savings passbooks”.70
These are worthy objectives and it will be in the UK’s own interests to continue 
to support them post-brexit. The EU’s approach has been to establish a set of common 
rules and then to leave enforcement to national authorities since these are normally 
matters for the criminal law best left to national criminal justice systems.71 At the 
same time the EU has balanced human and privacy rights against some of the mea-
sures aimed at combating money laundering and terrorism. On occasion, in the UK, 
these rights have been obscured by some anti-money laundering criminal law pro-
posals.72 In contrast the EU Commission and Parliament have represented bastions 
of liberalism to off-set some state actions.73
66 Eleni Tsingou, Money Laundering in Daniel Mügge (ed), Europe and the Governance of Global 
Finance, 140, 153 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014).
67 The most recent is Directive (EU) 2015/849 of 20th May 2015, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32015L0849>.
68 Thomas Incalza, National Anti-Money Laundering Legislation in a Unified Europe: Jyske 51 
Common Market Law Review 1829, 1845–1849 (2014).
69 Valsamis Mitsilegas and Bill Gilmore, The EU Legislative Framework Against Money Laun-
dering and Terrorist Finance: A Critical Analysis in the Light of Evolving Global Standards 56 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 119, 139–140 (2007).
70 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Annual Report 1999–2000, 20–22, <http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/1999%202000%20ENG.pdf>.
71 Melissa van den Broek, The EU’s Preventive AML/CFT Policy: Asymmetrical Harmonization 14 
Journal of Money Laundering Control 170, 170–171 (2011).
72 For example, The Law Society of England and Wales’ response to the consultation issued by 
the Home Office and HM Treasury on the Action Plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist 
finance legislative proposals, 14, (June 2016), <http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/policy-campaigns/con
sultation-responses/home-office-and-hm-treasury-consultation-on-the-action-plan-for-aml-and-cft-legis
lative-proposals/>, “The Society sees little value being added by the imposition of an illicit enrichment 
offence. [where]... [w]e would have concerns about the human rights implications of a reversal of the 
burden of proof, which should fall on the prosecution.”.
73 European Parliament, Draft Legislative Resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of 
money laundering and terrorist financing, (COM(2013)0045) – C7-0032/2013–2013/0025(COD)), (28th 
February 2014), <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-
2014-0150+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>, “It is important that Member States provide financial intelligence 
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It is important that the UK continues, post-brexit, to support EU actions implement-
ing FATF requirements. It will assist UK firms and their staff with EU operations in 
having only one set of regulations rather than having to comply with separate, and 
different, UK and EU rules establishing legal equivalence. It will help ensure that the 
UK remains cognizant of human rights expectations in this area and it will give con-
fidence to both EU and non-EU states that the UK continues to meet the highest 
standards in fighting financial crime and terrorism.
Sharing Intelligence
Supra-national agreements exist to counter money laundering and to share intelli-
gence.74 These are important but much of the effective work is undertaken by groups 
of agencies working together in a spirit of trust. In addition, there are international 
anti-money laundering groups, such as the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence 
Units, which share information. This body has some one hundred and fifty members 
organisations arranged into eight regional groups. Its purpose is to “follow the sus-
pected proceeds of crime ... across different jurisdictions”.75 However, while useful, 
the Egmont Group’s membership is diffused. The most effective organisations work 
in smaller groups. To a large extent this format is found within the EU and following 
brexit, to continue to be effective the UK would need to recreate these arrangements.
Influenced by the UK the latest Money Laundering Directive adopts a more risk 
base approach in-keeping with the UK style of regulation.76 The same Directive also 
requires that legal entities established in EU member states provide information on 
beneficial ownership to their local regulators and that this information is made avail-
able to regulators in other EU states and certain specified organisations such as banks 
etc.77 These are very useful provisions in the fight against organised crime and it is 
important that access to this information is not lost as a result of brexit.
Supra-National Enforcement
The enforcement of anti-money laundering regulations is undertaken at a national 
level. However, where the alleged crime involves a cross-border element there may 
units with the necessary resources ... while respecting fundamental rights, including the right to privacy 
and data protection.”
74 Joint Forum: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Ini-
tiatives to Combat Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (2003), <http://www.bis.org/
publ/joint05.pdf>.
75 Egmont Group, Annual Report 2014/5, xiv, <http://www.egmontgroup.org/library/annual-
reports>.
76 Supra, n 67, 4th Money Laundering Directive, Arts 6–8. There is also scope within the EU to 
improve the process for locating and seizing the proceeds of crime including money laundering, Emman-
uel Ioannides, Fundamental principles of EU law against money laundering, 27–30, (Ashgate Publish-
ing, Farnham, 2014).
77 Supra n 67, Art 30.
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be merit in coordinated action by two or more countries particularly if the action 
involves financial institutions operating in a number of states. This is still an area to 
be developed but it could parallel the EU’s work on anti-competitive practices.78
There are similar arguments in relation to the imposition of sanctions particularly 
against organisations and individuals. A considerable body of useful EU case law has 
been established in this area.79 Cooperation and information sharing at an EU level 
with organisations such as Europol assists in enforcing these sanctions and ensuring 
that there are, for example, fewer mistakes in mis-identifying individuals.
6. Cross-Border Payment Systems
The payments system is a fundamental part of banking. This does not necessary mean 
that it needs to be carried out by banks but they do need to have access to it. Moreover, 
the EU payments “landscape is undergoing a process of continuous transformation”.80 
However, the various payment arrangements continue to provide the mechanism by 
which the life-blood of the economy flows. Consequently, trust in the resilience of 
the payments system is fundamental to the stability of the financial system and the 
economy.81 Failures do occur and these need to be fully investigated. The most sig-
nificant recent example was the nine hour failure of the Bank of England’s “Real-Time 
Gross Settlement” system, known as “RTGS”, on 20th October 2014.82
The importance of the strength of the payments systems, both domestically and 
globally was seen during the recent financial crisis when the payments system infra-
structure operated without evident malfunction.83 Nevertheless work continues at the 
global level to improve resilience.84
78 EU Commission, Fines for Breaking EU Competition Law, Fact Sheet, (2011), <http://ec.europa.
eu/competition/cartels/overview/factsheet_fines_en.pdf8>, (accessed 23rd August 2016).
79 Piet Eeckhout, Sanctions Policy in EU External Relations Law, 500–548 (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2011). See also Christina Eckes, EU Counter-Terrorist Policies and Fundamental Rights: 
The Case of Individual Sanctions (Oxford University Press, Oxford, Oxford studies in European law, 
2009).
80 Jakub Górka, Preface in Jakub Górka (ed), Transforming Payment Systems in Europe, xii (Pal-
grave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2016).
81 Ed Kelsey and Simon Rickenbach, Enhancing the Resilience of the Bank of England’s Real-Time 
Gross Settlement Infrastructure, Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin, 316, 316, (2014 Q3) <http://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2014/qb14q305.pdf>.
82 Bank of England, Independent Review of Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) Outage on 
20th October 2014, (23rd March 2015), <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/
news/2015/rtgsdeloitte.pdf>.
83 Yvon Lucas, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Transfer Systems, Banque de France, Quar-
terly Selection of Articles, No. 14, 39, 39, (Summer 2009), <https://www.banque-france.fr/fileadmin/
user_upload/banque_de_france/Politique_Monetaire/QSA14_Impact.pdf>.
84 For example see the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, (SWIFT), 
Reducing Risk and Increasing Resilience in Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) Payment Systems, 
White Paper, (2014) <https://www.swift.com/file/1456/download?token=1WmncUfG>.
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Further, the EU has developed a number of arrangements to ensure an effective 
and robust Euro payments system. Even though the UK is not a member of the Euro-
zone the EU is likely to continue to be the UK’s largest trading partner. Consequently, 
whether or not the UK continues to be a major clearing area for Euro denominated 
financial contracts it will still rely on the EU’s payments systems.
For example, coming fully into effect in 2016, the Single Euro Payments Area 
(“SEPA”) provides a fast and integrated payment system for transferring Euros around 
the EU and its related members such as Norway and Switzerland.85 The development 
and enhancement of the system is guided by industry practitioners as part of the Euro-
pean Banking Federation Payments Regulatory Expert Group (EBF PREG).86
In addition, the EU have developed the Target2 (“Trans-European Automated 
Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System”). This is an updated system to 
settle national and cross-border Euro payments at central bank level. Some 350,000 
payments with a value of just under €2½ trillion are processed using Target2 each 
working day, a figure which is broadly equivalent to the size of Germany’s GDP.87 
The outstanding claims and liabilities of all the national central banks participating 
in Target2 are transferred to the European Central Bank at the end of the business 
day, where they are netted out.88 The UK decided in 2011 not to participate in the 
Target2 project but clearly it has a close interest in it and its success.89
In summary, while the UK is not a member of the Euro-zone it is still closely 
involved in the payments systems across the EU and it assists with technical and 
regulatory advice. Post-brexit the UK will still have trading and investment links with 
the EU. Consequently, it will need to work, if possible, with its former EU colleagues 
in ensuring that the technical requirements and guidance for the EU’s payment sys-
tems work for the UK as well as for the EU and that the UK is not subject to excessive 
access and transaction costs.
7. Regulatory Arbitrage and “Capture”
Regulation does not exist in a vacuum. It forms part of the economic structure under-
pinning the social and political fabric of society. Consequently, it is important to see 
85 EU Regulation N° 260/2012 (amending Regulation (EC) No 924/2009) as regards the migra-
tion to Union-wide credit transfers and direct debits, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013PC0937&from=EN>. See also European Central Bank, Payments, Securities 
and Derivatives and the Role of the Eurosystem, 187–192 (European Central Bank, Frankfurt, 2010).
86 Payments UK web-site, SEPA Regulation, <http://www.paymentsuk.org.uk/policy/european-
developments/sepa-regulation>, (accessed 15th August 2016).
87 Bundesbank web-site, <https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Standardartikel/Tasks/Pay-
ment_systems/target2_balance.html> (accessed 15th August 2016).
88 Ibid., (“Target2”).
89 Financial Times, UK snubs securities settlement overhaul, Bank of England will not take part 
in ‘Target2Securities (FT, 30th November 2011), <https://www.ft.com/content/b999dc22-eb6c-11e0-
9a41-00144feab49a>.
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regulation in its political and economic context.90 This has been developed further in 
that economic decisions, which include the format and application of regulation, needs 
to be seen within the institutional structure within which they operate. This includes 
the concept of “politics as economic exchange” with governments and their agencies 
carrying out a process of political and economic negotiation with voters and other 
stakeholders.91
These insights have usually been applied to areas such as fiscal policy. However, 
they apply equally to regulation. Regulation can impose costs on an industry and these 
costs may be passed onto consumers. At the same time regulation may benefit both 
the latter and firms within an industry by increasing consumer confidence and trust 
and thus both reduce transaction costs and increasing sales.92 In addition, regulation 
may act as a barrier to entry and exit from a business sector and have an effect on 
competition.93
Consequently, firms within an industry have a keen interest in regulation and, as 
already mentioned, may indeed, propose more regulations. As a result regulation 
influences the actions of firms subject to it and is, in turn, moulded by these businesses 
and other key stakeholders. This leads to a risk of “regulatory capture” if the power 
of certain stakeholders are too great and “if there is value to be gained through polit-
ical action, persons will invest resources in efforts to capture this value.”94
“Regulatory capture” is a risk which is particularly relevant to the UK since the 
financial services industry is so financially dominant. The banking industry alone 
employs approximately five hundred thousand people and contributes over £31 billion 
(some 5% of total tax revenue) in tax each year.95 “Regulatory capture” in this sense 
is simply a view which sees a congruence of interests between the organs of the state 
and the industry in question. This single-view may prevail at a nation state level.
90 Sam Peltzman, George Stigler’s Contribution to the Economic Analysis Of Regulation 101 Jour-
nal of Political Economy 818, 823–824 (October 1993).
91 Alan Peacock, The Calculus of Consent and Limits on Government Expenditure Growth in Public 
Choice Analysis In Historical Perspective, 85, 105, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge England, 
1997), <http://ebooks.cambridge.org.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/pdf_viewer.jsf?cid=CBO97805115595
32A026&ref=false&pubCode=CUP&urlPrefix=cambridge&productCode=cbo>. See also Knut Wick-
sell, A New Principle of Just Taxation in RA Musgrave and AT Peacock (eds), Classics in the Theory 
of Public Finance, 72 (Macmillan, London, 1958) and Richard Wagner, The ‘Calculus of Consent’: A 
Wicksellian Retrospective 56 Public Choice 153 (1988).
92 Bart Nooteboom, Hans Berger and Niels Noorderhaven, Effects of Trust and Governance on 
Relational Risk 40 The Academy of Management Journal 308, 310 (April 1997). For example, see 
Coffee, supra, n 4, at 245–246. See also Michael Pollitt, The Economics of Trust, Norms and Networks 
11 Business Ethics, A European Review 119, 120–122 (April 2002) setting out the importance of trust 
and conformity with social norms in economic growth.
93 Rosa Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Law, 116 (Second edition, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2015).
94 James Buchanan, Public Choice: The Origins And Development of a Research Program, George 
Mason University, Center for Study of Public Choice, 6, (2003), <https://www.gmu.edu/centers/public-
choice/pdf%20links/Booklet.pdf>.
95 British Bankers Association, Banking on British Jobs, 6, (October 2015), <https://www.bba.org.
uk/publication/bba-reports/>.
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As mentioned, regulatory capture in this context does not suggest any form of cor-
ruption but rather the risk that regulators start to see the world from the same perspec-
tive as the firms they regulate at the expense of the public interest.96 There are two 
primary issues with regulatory capture: first, that regulation may be too lax and not 
reflect the public interest and, second, that incumbent firms seek tough regulation, 
which they are able to sustain, as a barrier to new entrants to the industry (“every 
industry ....that has enough political power to utilize the state will seek to control 
entry”).97
However, there are counter-balancing factors. While it is possible to see business 
working only for its own self interest, the financial services industry, for example, is 
not a homogeneous, monolithic enterprise. It consists of many competing firms of all 
sizes and interests and this diversity increases when viewed at a supra-national level. 
In addition, it would be wrong to see all firms as all “red in tooth and claw” fighting 
against the public interest. The industry does not operates in a vacuum but with com-
peting interests both within it, and outside, encompassed by wider institutions which 
facilitate “social decisions to be taken through public discussion and social 
interchange”.98
EU institutions have the advantage that they are generally more remote from 
national politics and subject to wider competing forces. They exist in a form favoured 
by James Buchanan within a high-level constitution, set-up “behind a veil of 
uncertainty”.99 There are, nevertheless, clearly issues with EU institutional actions 
to defend the Euro or to establish, for example, a common deposit protection fund 
where EU-wide economic and political factors predominate.100 At the same time the 
European Central Bank continues to accept EU government securities as part of its 
quantitative
easing programme.101 However, the ECB is not alone in accepting government 
backed securities. The Bank of Japan government bond holding is extensive and the 
96 George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation 2 The Bell Journal of Economics and Man-
agement Science 3, 5 (Spring 1971).
97 Friedrich Heinemann and Martin Schüler, A Stiglerian View on Banking Supervision 121 Public 
Choice 99–100 (July 2004).
98 Amartya Sen, On James Buchanan 80 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 367, 368 
(2011).
99 Andre Azevedo Alves, No Salvation through Constitutions: Jasay versus Buchanan and Rawls 20 
Independent Review 33, 39 (Summer 2015). The “veil of uncertainty” is explained as the result which 
“follows directly from the fact that the interest of any person or group is much less easily identified in 
the choice among rules. It is much more difficult for a person to determine which of the several choice 
options confronted will, indeed, maximize whatever set of values that person desired to maximize.” It 
parallels John Rawls’ “veil of ignorance”.
100 Thomas Huertas, Crisis, Cause, Containment and Cure, 130–132 (Palgrave Macmillan, Basing-
stoke, 2010).
101 ECB’s Asset Purchase Programme, “The expanded asset purchase programme includes all pur-
chase programmes under which private sector securities and public sector securities are purchased to 
address the risks of a too prolonged period of low inflation.” ECB web-site, <https://www.ecb.europa.
eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html> (accessed 6th Sept 2016).
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US Federal Reserve’s balance sheet consisted largely of government-sponsored enter-
prise (GSE) debt and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued by those GSEs.102
A distinction needs to be drawn between “regulation” and “supervision”. The for-
mer is the process of rule-making while the latter concerns the application of these 
rules. Supervision, outside the Single Supervisory Mechanism, falls to national 
authorities where national knowledge of regulated firms, the local markets in which 
they operate and the political and cultural context have been seen as paramount. Con-
versely, much banking regulation has been developed at a supra-national level; much 
of it by “soft” law. However, within the EU regulation has been much more prescrip-
tive with the so-called “single rule book” and detailed guidance.103 The regulatory 
architecture makes it much more difficult to “capture” the EU regulatory and supervi-
sion structure. Consequently, it is more difficult for an industry to influence a supra-
national body such as the EU Commission or Parliament where a wider range of 
influences are likely to flourish.104
A further aspect of “regulatory capture” is the risk that a single national regulator 
may develop into a “regulatory monoculture”.105 Individual national regulators may 
have more uniform views compared to a supra-national body which has a more diver-
sified perspective. There is always a risk that a national regulator may develop a view 
that it alone is right and following a path-dependent approach to regulating build its 
regulatory arrangements on historical themes which may no longer be relevant nor 
current best practice as markets change and systems and risks evolve. A lack of diver-
sity and challenge may produce an inwardly looking regulator with an ossified regu-
latory approach and unseen risks may suddenly emerge to threaten individual banks 
and the financial system as a whole.106
102 Brett Fawley and Christopher Neely, Four Stories of Quantitative Easing, Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis Review, 95(1), 51, 60–66 and 69 (January/February 2013), <https://research.stlouisfed.org/
publications/review/13/01/Fawley.pdf>.
103 EU Council, Council Conclusions on Strengthening EU Financial Supervision, Press Release, 
3, 9th June 2009, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/108389.
pdf>.
104 This is a variant of the proposal by Pierre Boyer and Jorge Ponce, Regulatory Capture and Bank-
ing Supervision Reform 8 Journal of Financial Stability 206 (September 2012). They suggest multiple 
supervisors for each institution to reduce the likelihood of “capture”.
105 See a discussion of the risks of developing a financial monoculture in a speech by Andrew Hal-
dane in which he said that “the level playing field resulted in everyone playing the same game at the 
same time, often with the same ball”, Rethinking the Financial Network, a speech given at the Financial 
Student Association, Amsterdam, 28th April 2009, <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Docu-
ments/historicpubs/speeches/2009/speech386.pdf>.
106 Stress Testing Banks: What Have We Learned?, remarks by Ben Bernanke at a financial markets 
conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Stone Mountain, Georgia, 13, 8th April 
2013, discussing monocultures in supervisory models, <https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20130408a.pdf>.
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At the same time it is also important to ensure a balance between “adversarial 
regulation” and “negotiated rule-making” since the former may miss the target or 
have unintended consequences due to a failure to engage with the affected industry.107
Further, the strength of regulation and the attitude of supervisors are factors in 
investment decisions by global banks in determining where to establish and develop 
their businesses.108 There is a balance to be struck between over-regulation which 
may deter investment and lax regulation which undermine the credibility of the juris-
diction and the businesses that operate within its boundaries.
An important defence, provided by the EU’s system of regulation, is the construc-
tion of “administrative insulation” around the rules’ making process.109 There are a 
number of methods which may be used to achieve this including processes which 
balance lobbying by interest groups, removing the making of regulation from the 
day-to-day political process and protecting the funding of the rule-makers from 
political interference.
The current EU approach to making regulations may be time-consuming but it does 
challenge individual national agendas. National jurisdictions may be wedded to their 
own arrangements for a variety of reasons including regulatory hubris, a wish to avoid 
the political and economic costs of change and the desire to seek competitive advan-
tage. The approach adopted by the EU frequently employs comparative research and 
takes account of views from all the major stakeholders balancing these positions both 
at the EU Commission and Parliament stages of the legislative process. The views of 
many countries and organisations are considered and while some of these may only 
be used to reinforce existing biases it provides an opportunity and process for more 
diverse reflection. It makes it more difficult for national regulators to be “captured” 
in the sense that they only see regulation through the perspective of their own estab-
lished national businesses.
In addition, it is much easier to organise a small, as opposed to a large, group of 
industry firms to act collectively to change some regulations.110 Propelled by the 
recent financial crisis the consolidation of financial services firms has continued 
apace. This industry-wide concentration may find it easier to speak with one voice in 
order to influence government and regulatory policy. A more fragmented industry 
across a number of jurisdictions is likely to find this more difficult.
107 David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture 89 Washington Law Review 329, 336 and 340–
343 (2014).
108 David Llewellyn, Rationale for Financial Regulation, Financial Services Authority Occasional 
Paper No. 1, 10–11, (April 1999), <http://www.fep.up.pt/disciplinas/pgaf924/PGAF/Texto_2_David_
Llewellyn.pdf>. See also Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh and Rita Ramalho, Regulation and Growth 
92 Economics Letters 395–401 (2006).
109 Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design 89 Texas 
Law Review 15, 79 (2010).
110 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 33–34 (first published in 1965, 2nd ed., Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971), <http://outsidethetext.com/archive/Olson.pdf>. This 
develops an aspect of David Hume’s argument for the need for government, A Treatise of Human 
Nature, Book III, Part II, Section VII, 538 (original edition 1739–1740, reprinted by Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1978).
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Consequently, there are considerable advantages, post-brexit, in the UK continuing 
to adopt and implement EU Directives, Regulations and Technical Guidance. This 
would go beyond the need to ensure “equivalence” in order to protect EU passporting 
rights since it would continue to enhance UK regulatory creditability and help to 
ensure that there was no perception of “regulatory capture”. This would have added 
weight since the UK, post-brexit, is unlikely to have any influence on EU rule mak-
ing.
8. Coordination on Improving Culture, Ethics and Individual Accountability
The financial crisis, the subsequent scandals involving benchmark indices and the 
extensive evasion of anti-money laundering and sanctions requirements revealed 
significant issues with corporate culture and individual ethics in banks and other 
financial institutions.111 These issues are corrosive and taint even those in the industry 
who have done no wrong.112 Clearly, these failures are not the preserve of financial 
services and can be found in other industries but there has been a marked occurrence 
of them in, for example, banking. There may be a number of reasons for this but there 
have been significant issues with the adequacy of corporate governance and the 
recruitment, training and supervision of staff at all levels and the frequent mis-use of 
mis-aligned incentives. But, at its heart, there has been a serious lack of understand-
ing by banks and their management of their role in, and accountability to, the society 
in which they operate. The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, in its 
final report, said that “one of the most dismal features of the banking industry....was 
the striking limitation on the sense of personal responsibility and accountability of 
the leaders within the industry for the widespread failings and abuses over which they 
presided.”113
Supra-national guidance and subsequent regulation has a number of advantages 
over national rule-making. It can set common standards to be applied by all jurisdic-
tions and the supra-national body can monitor implementation and report progress, 
or lack of it, essentially shaming laggard nations. This can help reduce the risk of 
“regulatory arbitrage” mentioned earlier. Supra-national organisations may provide 
high-levels of expertise (e.g. the technical areas of payments or anti-money launder-
111 “the public have the sense that advantage has been taken of them, that bankers have received 
huge rewards, that some of those rewards have not been properly earned, and in some cases have been 
obtained through dishonesty …” See Changing Banking for Good: Report of the Parliamentary Com-
mission on Banking Standards, 15, para. 8, (HL Paper 27-I, HC 175-I, published June 2013), <https://
www.parliament.uk/documents/banking-commission/Banking-final-report-volume-i.pdf>.
112 “Financial trouble in one institution can quickly spread to others. Reputational damage is also 
contagious, especially at a time when banks in general are held in such low public esteem. The prob-
lems of a particular bank ... can still flow across to others in the system.” Sir Richard Lambert, Banking 
Standards Review, 6 (May 2014), <http://1984london.com/_banking-standards/pdf/banking-standards-
review.pdf>.
113 Changing Banking for Good, supra nn 111, 16, para. 14.
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ing), help jurisdictions subject to political inertia and, what Brummer describes as, 
“legislative shirking”.114 Legislation within the EU can also reinforce these common 
standards with effective sanctions. In addition, local jurisdictions may be competent 
to legislate and to supervise businesses established within their territories but lack the 
ability to regulate global markets. This is area where supra-national policy-making 
may be more successful. There may be similar issues with large global companies or 
systemically important financial institutions. Finally, as mentioned earlier, it is more 
difficult for firms to influence supra-national organisations.
The Financial Stability Board has issued guidance in this area and the need for 
boards and senior executives to take responsibility.115 This is reflected, in part, in Pil-
lar II of the EU’s Capital Requirements Directive IV.116 Individual EU states have 
gone further and taken specific action to improve senior executive and staff account-
ability.117 The EU Commission has, for example, taken action against ten cross-border 
banks operating in the Euro and Yen interest rate derivative markets and issued fines 
of almost €1.5 billion in total.118 It is clear that the EU Commission has the ability 
and will to address cross-border failures.
In addition, as the Bank of England’s Fair and Effective Markets Review points 
out recent important EU Regulations will improve conduct “in UK and other Euro-
pean fixed income, currency and commodities markets with the introduction of the 
Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) in 2016, and the revised Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive and new Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFID2) 
in 2017.”119 For example, there will be a new high level principle requiring investment 
firms to “act honestly, fairly and professionally and communicate in a way which is 
114 Supra n 2, 24–26.
115 Financial Stability Board, Guidance on Supervisory Interaction with Financial Institutions on 
Risk Culture, 3–4 (April 2014), <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/140407.pdf?page_moved=1>.
116 Prudential Regulatory Authority, Policy Statement PS17/15, Assessing Capital Adequacy under 
Pillar 2, (issued in July 2015 and updated in August 2015). This builds on the Capital Requirements 
Directive IV’s Pillar 2A methodology which includes, as part of the internal capital adequacy assessment 
process (ICAAP), an assessment of “the governance arrangements of the firm, its corporate culture and 
values, and the ability of members of the management body to perform their duties.” (Prudential Regula-
tory Authority, Supervisory Statement | SS5/13: The ICAAP and the Supervisory Review and Evaluation 
Process (SREP), 4, para. 3.2, (December 2013). The new framework came into force on 1st January 
2016, <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/cp/2015/pillar2/cp115.pdf>.
117 For example see the Prudential Regulatory Authority/Bank of England’s and Financial Conduct 
Authority’s Senior Management and Certified Persons Regime, Policy Statement, PS3/15, Strengthening 
Individual Accountability in Banking And Insurance, (March 2015), <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
pra/Documents/publications/ps/2015/ps315.pdf>.
118 EU Commission web-site, EU Commission fines banks € 1.49 billion for participating in cartels 
in the interest rate derivatives industry, Press Release, (4th December 2013), <http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-13-1208_en.htm10> (accessed 23rd August 2016).
119 Bank of England, Fair and Effective Markets Review, Final Report, 49 (June 2015), <http://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/femrjun15.pdf>.
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fair, clear and not misleading, taking into account the nature of the eligible counter-
party and its business”.120
Work on developing international standards aimed at improving culture and ethics 
in financial services is still at a very early stage. Some EU states, such as the Nether-
lands, are well ahead in this area.121 The European Central Bank, as part of its devel-
opment of its “Single Supervisory Mechanism” (SSM) has also started to assess the 
culture of the largest banks subject to the SSM.122 UK regulators have engaged with 
the Dutch central bank on its approach to assessing bank culture and have initiated 
their own actions.123 However, it is difficult to know how cooperation and develop-
ment will continue in this area, at an EU level, after brexit. Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant that that this cross-border work is not lost and that it is developed further for the 
benefit of customers, businesses and the integrity of financial markets as a whole.
However, with cross-border financial services there is more that could and should 
be done at a pan-European level. For example, the review undertaken as part of the 
Bank of England’s Fair and Effective Markets Review found that “further action 
[needs] to be taken to prevent the ‘recycling’ of individuals with poor conduct records 
between firms: the so-called ‘rolling bad apples’”.124 This may be a particular issue 
when individuals move across borders and firms find it difficult to obtain transparent 
references on these applicants from previous employers. The latter may be operating 
to different standards and legislation and may be exposed to different risks in provid-
ing references. These issues can only be addressed by cooperation between regulators 
working to common objectives, standards, procedures and regulations. The current 
EU structures provide a mechanism for undertaking this. There could be common 
standards including an obligation on an employer to provide a timely reference and 
that all references must be fair and accurate. There are a number of issues that would 
need to be resolved such as the effects of employees resigning before a disciplinary 
process is completed; how references should address an employer’s suspicion of 
employee wrong-doing which has not resolved through the disciplinary process; 
adverse information about a former employee which only come to light after they 
have left and joined a new firm and the role of financial supervisors in this process. 
120 Art. 30, Directive 2014/65/EU of 15th May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and 
amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014L0065>.
121 De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), Behaviour and Culture in the Dutch Financial Sector (Sep-
tember 2015), <http://www.dnb.nl/en/binaries/DNB%20brochure%20gedrag%20en%20cultuur%20
2015%20ENG_tcm47-326577.pdf?2016080511>.
122 The relevance of the supervision of behaviour and culture to the SSM, speech by Julie Dickson, 
Member of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank, at the conference “Looking Forward: 
Effective Supervision of Behaviour and Culture at Financial Institutions”, organised by De Neder-
landsche Bank, Amsterdam, 24th September 2015, <https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/
speeches/date/2015/html/se150924.en.html>.
123 Prudential Regulatory Authority, Statement of Policy: The Use of PRA Powers to Address Seri-
ous Failings in the Culture of Firms, (June 2014), <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/
publications/policy/2014/powersculture.pdf>.
124 Supra, n 119, Fair and Effective Markets Review, at 62.
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Many of these aspects fall within the realm of national private law. Moreover, within 
different EU legal systems some of these issues may present both legal, reputational 
and commercial risks.
There is a significant public interest in this area which is worthy of consideration 
at an EU-wide level. Ideally, the UK should be part of this discussion since it has 
much to gain, or lose, depending on the outcome. If, however, the UK is not a EU 
member some alternative form of cooperation will need to be devised otherwise UK 
based firms and their customers and markets may be exposed to risks from “rogue” 
individuals.125
9. Conclusion
Much has been done both nationally and globally to reduce risks to the financial sys-
tem after the recent financial crisis. Nevertheless, the threats to financial stability 
remain acute. These risks may be mitigated by a range of measures including sound 
economic policies and by robust regulation and supervision. However, as noted these 
policies cannot be undertaken in a “national vacuum”.
John Donne, with whom this article starts, quotes from Ecclesiastes in an earlier 
part of his Devotions recommending that people work together in cooperation “for if 
they fall, the one will lift up his fellow: but woe to him that is alone when he falleth; 
for he hath not another to help him up.”126 Similarly, it is not possible to operate suc-
cessfully in financial services without working closely with other financial service 
agencies in other jurisdictions. This cooperation needs to go beyond regulatory com-
mittee meetings and the exchange of papers etc. The objective is to build trust and 
common purpose. Doing so is more likely to transcend petty national interests and 
the striving for short-term advantage. There is both a pragmatic and a moral objective: 
if a nation tries to succeed alone and stumbles it is less likely to be assisted by others. 
However, if it is seen as being trustworthy it will have stored up a wealth of moral 
“capital” upon which it can draw in times of trouble.
The predominance of the financial connections between the UK and rest of the EU 
strengthens the view that here, at least, there needs to be a redoubling of effort to work 
125 For example, there could be an EU, or even a global, register of senior financial services staff 
including data supplied by employers and accessible, with the consent of the person applying for 
employment, by firms seeking to recruit the individual. This has been suggested at a national level, 
Enhancing financial stability by improving culture in the financial services industry, Remarks by Wil-
liam Dudley, President and Chief Executive Office of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 20th 
October 2014 at the workshop on reforming culture and behavior in the financial services industry,at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, <https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/
speeches/2014/dud141020a.html>. See also remarks made by Elizabeth Corley in Annex III: High-level 
summary of June industry roundtable on governance frameworks in FSB, Measures to Reduce Miscon-
duct Risk, Second Progress Report, 24, (1st September 2016), <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/
Measures-to-reduce-misconduct-risk-Second-Progress-Report.pdf>.
126 Ecclesiastes 4:10, King James Version, in Donne, Expostulation V, 49, supra, n 1.
ALAN BRENER1056
closely with the various EU institutions and agencies. This will help enhance trust 
and ensure that the UK continues to be seen as a trustworthy partner whether it be in 
the many operational areas mentioned earlier or by reducing the risk of “regulatory 
capture” and in developing the broader themes of improving ethical conduct and 
accountability among financial services firms.
